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THE SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY 
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 
FACT OR FICTION? 
After four decades of autocratic rule, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) is at one of those critical moments in history 
when a society engages in great activities that will dramatically change its 
character and behaviour from the past within a decade or so. Examples that 
come to mind for East Asia are the Meiji Restoration of the 1870s, South Korea's 
march to industrialise in the 1960s, and the Guomindang (KMT) on Taiwan 
embarking on major reforms of that society in the 1950s. 
As for the PRC's critical historical moment of the 1990s, its leaders and elites 
have committed themselves to building a socialist society based neither on 
state-run planning nor on a capitalist market economy but rather on a middle 
road of economic development and modernisation that they define as a socialist 
market economy with Chinese characteristics. Although such an economy has 
never existed in any communist-controlled society, the CCP seems determined 
to put it into practice. 
Between 1992 and 1994 a dialogue and a large number of experiments were 
conducted in the PRC to ascertain how to build this socialist market economy. 
I first want to describe the context in which Deng Xiaoping's thinking, the 
Party's decision to follow a new path, and the new economic patterns evolved. 
Then, after discussing how the dialogue and experiments affected five basic 
issues, I conclude with some reflections about their significance for the PRC's 
future. 
Deng Xiaoping 's Thought (A New Ti.xi ?) 
The Chinese publish the expressions of their leaders because of the compet-
ition among those leaders to be perceived as the 'publicly moral, enlightened 
elite who should lead China (junzi)'. Going back to imperial times, the person 
who offered a clear vision, uttered maxims of wisdom, and persuaded others 
to obey-and all more convincingly than anyone else-earned the respect 
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and praise of supporters and opponents alike and was glorified by elites and 
commoners. 
Thus, CCP-selected works and dictionaries contain the aphorisms and 
expressions of those judged to be in the communist pantheon of great leaders: 
Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and of course Deng. Small in 
stature, a survivor of countless political struggles, and a key player in the CCP's 
inner circle of power holders, Deng Xiaoping has exerted an enormous 
influence on China's elite these past fifteen years. Party members and citizens 
commit his expressions to memory. 1 What quintessential ideas set Deng apart 
from the other greats in the revered communist leadership? Do they consist 
of a new system of thinking (tixt) that will save China? 
According to Deng, socialism is the natural evolutionary stage China must 
attain,2 but many decades of hard work and sacrifice will pass before China 
can enter the golden era of socialism. A mature, workable socialism means 
negligible differences in the distribution of income and wealth, sufficient 
community wealth for all, and exemplary citizenship values and moral 
behaviour. What kind of economic system is most compatible with these 
goals? By seeking truth from facts (sbisbi qiusbt), China's experience and 
Marxist analysis demonstrate that the planned economy has not worked and 
that capitalism must be avoided. 
Thus, the centrepiece of the new order is a socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics, a new economic system that will be neither capitalist 
nor planned-economy socialist but contain elements of both. As Deng said in 
his January 1992 tour of southern China: 
Whether the emphasis is on planning or on the market mechanism is not the 
essential distinction between socialism and capitalism. A planned economy is 
not socialism; there is planning under capitalism too. A market economy is not 
capitalism; there is market regulation under socialism too. Planning and 
market regulation are both means of controlling economic activity. In essence, 
the objective of socialism is to liberate and develop the productive forces, to 
eliminate exploitation and polarisation, and ultimately to achieve common 
prosperity.3 
1 Wang Jing and Cai Kaisong, eds, Gongheguo lingsbou da zidian: Deng Xiaoping zhuan 
[The great directory of our Republic's leaders: Deng Xiaoping) (Chengdu, Sichuan: 
Sichuansheng Xinhua Shudian Zongfaxing, 1993). 
2 Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping xuan: di san zhuan [The collected works of Deng 
Xiaoping, vol.3] (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1993). 
3 Wu jingta, ed., Sbehut zhut sbichangjingjt zhuanshu [Comprehensive compendium on 
the socialist market economy] (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 1993), p.135. 
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For Deng, the market favours a new type of publicly-owned enterprise and 
cooperative forms of wealth4 that will be highly productive, diverse in forms 
of property rights, and operational in markets. Deng feels that market forces 
encourage advanced technology, the efficient production and exchange of 
goods and services, and the rational use of resources. 
To avoid market failure and other pathologies, macro-adjustments and 
control mechanisms (beng guan tiaotoni) will be built into this new system. 
The challenge facing the CCP, says Teng, is to avoid the policies of left-wing 
opponents who long for a return to a planned economy and the Maoist methods 
of the past and stand ready to sabotage the new system.5 At the same time, the 
Party must not allow ea pitalist forces , which produce income disparity and class 
struggle, to dominate the new system. The CCP must steadfastly resist the calls 
of left and right and persevere to build the new socialist market economy. 
That economy should also be firmly connected to a political and legal 
system managed by the CCP,6 which, although not allowing opposition 
parties, will gradually allow voters to elect delegates to representative bodies 
that will discuss and ratify laws. Moreover, only those ideas that do not degrade, 
endanger, or replace Marxism and its related thought will be allowed to 
compete in education and the ideological market-place. 
The reforms launched by the CCP in the 1980s embodied Deng's ideas and 
created a favourable climate for the CCP's new party line at its Fourteenth 
Congress in October 1992. That new line signaled a decisive break with the 
planned economy and a commitment to translate Deng's concept of a socialist 
market economy into reality. 
The CCP Breaks with the Past 
Between 5 and 9October1992, CCP leaders at the Fourteenth Congress drew 
up a list of new tasks and revised the Party's charter.7 The congress's keynote 
4 Zhongyang Dangxiao jingji Xuebu [Economic Education Department of the Central CCP 
School], Deng Xiaoping shichangjingji degouxiangyu shixian[Deng Xiaoping's design 
and implementation of a market economy) (Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 
1994), p.2o6. See also Hu Sheng, 'What is socialism. How should we build socialism? 
-studying Tbe Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol.3', in Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (FBIS), Daily report: China, FBIS-CHI-94-125 (29 June 1994), pp.26-35. 
5 Ibid., pp.2o6-7. 6 Ibid., ch.11. 
7 Zhuanjibian Weihui [Special Issue Editorial Committee], Dut Zhonggong 'shistda ' yu 
guan wenti pingshi zhuanjt [Special issue to evaluate and analyse the issues regarding 
the Chinese Communist Party Fourteenth Party Congress (Taipei: Zhonggong Yanjiu 
Zazhishe, 1992), pp.l-3. 
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address w:;is delivered on 12 October by Party Secretary-General Jiang Zemin, 
who, after committee reviews and a review by Deng, had revised his 26,000-
character report ten times. Jiang's report set forth the concept and strategy of 
a socialist market economy and emphasised avoiding right-wing and left-wing 
deviations. As the Party affirmed the new road of economic reform, it assigned 
this task of national economic reform to the State Council, whose organs 
worked hard to put teeth into it. 
The State Council's reform committees prepared reports and drafted laws 
to regulate the new economy: the first stage calls for improving commodity 
and factor markets in 1994-95, especially a capital market and initiating state 
enterprise property rights reform; the second stage in 1996-97 calls for further 
market reforms and breakthroughs in developing capital and labour markets; 
the third stage, 1998-2000, is to complete market reform, transform state 
enterprises into a corporate system of mixed property rights, and put in place 
macro-economic regulation and controls.8 
But as the Party and state rapidly initiated these momentous changes, 
inflation exploded. By applying the brakes on the money supply and 
investment, inflation slowed slightly but by September 1994 still raged at 27% 
in the cities. At the same time, imports surged, contributing to a whopping 
US$12.18 billion trade imbalance, but controls imposed in late 1993 kept the 
trade imbalance under control. The Chinese leadership, now committed to 
initiating major reforms to build a socialist economy, confronted socio-
economic problems of enormous magnitude: generating jobs for farmers and 
young people flooding the workforce, controlling severe inflation and trying 
to limit the widening income disparities, subsidising the debt-ridden public 
enterprises while trying to reform them, and a host of other problems too 
numerous to cite. These reforms also were associated with new economic 
patterns that had become more commonplace since 1992. 
Tbe New Economic Patterns 
In 1992 the cumulative economic changes in the PRC of the previous decade 
coalesced, setting off the strongest economic boom since economic reform 
began in 1979 and, in effect, creating more prosperity than poverty. This boom 
took the form of greater integration of China's markets with the world economy; 
8 'Procedure for implementing the overall plan of building socialist market economy 
system', Zhongguo tongxun she, 10 August 1994, translated in FBIS, Daily Report: China, 
FBIS-CHI-94-156 (12 August 1994), p.22. 
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growing domestic market integration; high growth rates in gross domestic 
product (GDP), foreign and domestic investment, labour participation, and the 
money supply; increased GDP in the services and manufacturing sectors and 
a declining one in agriculture; and, in manufacturing, the growing role of private 
and cooperative enterprises and the declining role of public enterprises. 
Between 1992 and 1993 the PRC's percentage of exports of GDP increased 
from 18%> to 22%.9 GDP increased 8% in 1992 and 13.2% in 1993, with a lOOA> 
growth projected for 1994.10 In 1993 foreign investment amounted to US$25.8 
billion, accounting for 13% of total investment in assets compared with 8% in 
1992.11 The Republic of China increased its investment to the PRC from US$3.5 
billion in 1991 to US$16.8 billion in September 1993.12 Domestic investment 
surged by 42.6% in 1992 and 46% in 1993 compared with the previous highest 
single year's growth of 38.8% in 1985.13 The money supply rose more rapidly 
than the authorised investment funds in the national budget: 47% in 1984, 97% · 
in 1987, 31% in 1989, and 66% in 1992, producing (as already mentioned) 
inflationary spurts that between January and September 1994 reached 27% in 
the cities.14 In 1993 the proportion of industrial output produced by state-
owned enterprises declined below 500Ai; for private and collective enterprises 
it exceeded 500/o.15 In the early 1990s the services sector greatly expanded, 
producing more than 300/o of GDP.16 
9 Richard D. Fisher,Jr., and John T. Dori , U.S. and Asia Statistical Handbook, 1994 edition 
(Washington: Heritage Foundation, 1994), p.35; and Kari Huus, 'A scramble for status', 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 September 1994, pp.46-7. 
10 Zhongguo Kexueyuan Suliang Jingji yu jixu Jingji Yanjiuso, 'Zhongguo jingji fazhan: 
1993 nian tedian, 1994 nian zoushih zi yu guan duice' [China's economic development: 
the special characteristics of 1993 and the trends and policies of 1994], jingji yanjiu 2 
(February 1994), p .l. 
11 Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, China 's Economy in 1993 and 
1994: The Search for a Soft Landing (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 
1994), p.18. 
12 For 1992 see Huang Tianzhung and Zhang Wuchiu , eds, Liang 'an guansbi yu dalu 
zhengci [Cross-straits relations and mainland policy) (Taipei: Wunan Dushu Chuban 
Yuxian Gongsi, 1993), p.247. For 1993 see Sung K'o-han, 'A major event that will 
stimulate economic and trade relations between Taiwan and the mainland', jingbao 
(Hong Kong) 201 (April 1994), p.80. 
13 'Zhongguo jingji fazhan ', p.2. 14 Ibid. 
15 CIA, China's Economy in 1993 and 1994, p.9. 
l6 The share of GDP from services rose from 20.6% in 1980 to 28.1 % in 1989. See Lin Li, 
ed., 'Contradictions of the dual structure and economic development in the nineties', 
jingji yanjtu 7 (20 July 1993), pp.3-14, translated in]PRS Report: China. JPRS-CAR-93-
088 (14 December 1993), p .12. My assumption is that by 1994, given the great 
economic boom, the share of GDP from services has finally surpassed 30%. 
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Breaking a long-standing economic taboo, for the first time there was a 
free labour market for both enterprises and workers, meaning that since 1992 
people in all walks of life, especially in the CCP and government, have begun 
changing their careers and abandoning their jobs to start businesses and work 
in the private sector, a practice called 'leaping into the sea' (xiahai). By mid-
1992 as many as 120,000 persons had reportedly left public administration to 
work in the private sector.17 Engineers and scientists in large numbers started 
new businesses, some 1,500 of them forming several hundred new companies 
in Tianjin.18 Fifty professors from Zhejiang Provincial University became man-
agers in new companies. In Beijing eighteen PhDs in science and engineering 
formed a consulting company for new companies. In Shantung's Yentai city 
a newspaper advertising for managers with master's degrees in business 
administration received 160,000 applications in one month, including many 
from CCP cadres, government officials, and even members of the CCP's central 
committee.19 For the first time since 1949 people were not punished or 
harassed for leaving the Party and government to become self-employed or 
work for others to earn a profit.20 
Leaping into the sea continued. Government ministries allowed public 
wealth to help new companies go into business at home and abroad. For 
example, the 999 Pharmaceutical Company, which had close links with the 
Chinese military establishment, was bringing in products through San 
Francisco, planning a factory in Florida, and negotiating a research venture 
in San Diego.21 Chinese magazines reported the rags-to-riches transform-
ations of many ordinary people.22 
Needless to say, the regime had its own spin on this new phenomenon. 
On 7 January 1993, the Economic Daily stated: 
Leaping into the sea is to march into the central battlefield of economic con-
struction. In a deeper way, this term should be understood to mean the liber-
l7 Ibid., p.5. 
l9 Ibid., p.42. 
18 Ibid., p.40. 
20 Ibid. , p.90. 
21 E. S. Browning, 'China drug company with ties to military is expanding to U.S.', Wall 
Streetjournal, 7 September 1994, p.A-8. 
22 Take the incredible story of Chang Ming-yi.i from Taiwan, who used US$1,000 given him 
by his fiancee, went to Tientsin in 1992 and purchased 620,000 ha. of old salt fields. 
Several months later he was able to resell this land at a value many times what he 
originally paid, making him extremely wealthy. How an individual from Taiwan could 
buy public land on the mainland to resell at a profit is never explained in this report. 
See Huang Hui-chuan, 'Xiao zuben chuangzao da zuchan' [Small capital creates great 
wealth], Zhongshi zhoukan 139 (28 August-3 September 1994), pp.42-5. 
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ation of ideas, the development of human potential, and the promotion of more 
rapid growth and productivity. Llberating basic ideas is really the essential 
meaning of this term. Had it not been for the Party Central Committee's third 
plenum and eleventh meeting and Deng Xiaoping's southern tour, leaping into 
the sea would never have been possible. 23 
Movie stars and other entertainers also began leaping into the sea. 24 Liu 
Shaoqing, a female movie star, set up her own company, used her name to 
advertise its products, and then branched into real estate, becoming a 
millionaire. Writers and novelists organised companies, hoping to strike it 
rich. University students took part-time jobs and tried their hands at new 
enterprises. Those who succeeded were called 'the economic man on 
campus' (xiaoyuan jingjiren) instead of 'the big man on campus' (xiaoyuan 
daban). One student compiled a Collection of Literature (Wengu) and 
marketed it, earning 400,000 yuan, which enabled him to rent a hotel suite and 
come to classes in a taxi. 25 
The 1992-94 economic boom began as markets opened, foreign and 
domestic investment increased, the money supply expanded, and economic 
taboos ended. It overheated the economy but created new jobs and oppor-
tunities on a scale never before seen in China. Many publicly admitted that 
this 'take-off' would have been impossible without Deng Xiaoping's trip to 
the south in January 1992, which helped persuade the CCP leadership to 
chart a new direction for the economy.26 And Deng's new vision appealed 
to the majority elites, who were weary and disillusioned with Mao's trans-
formative dream of building a socialist Utopia through unending class 
struggle. Therefore, Deng's ability to persuade the CCP leaders and elite 
succeeded, with the Party committing itself to build a new economic system 
of a kind never before attempted in China. 
23 Chen Ruying, ed., Xiabat kuangcbao [The mania for leaping into the seal (Beijing: 
Tuanjie Chubanshe, 1993), p.47. 
24 Ibid., p.2. 
25 Ibid., p.4. 
26 Suisheng Zhao, 'Deng Xiaoping's southern tour: elite politics in post-Tiananmen China', 
Asian Suroey 33.8 (August 1993), pp.739-56. Zhao argues that Deng and Chen Yun 
were involved in a major power struggle to influence the Party's agenda and 'line' at the 
Founeenth Pany Congress, held in late 1992. To seize the moment, Deng orchestrated 
the southern tour and succeeded in eliciting CCP elite suppon for accelerating economic 
reform and building the socialist market economy, in essence rejecting Chen Yun's 
strategy to maintain a planned economy. 
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Tbe Great Discourse and Experiment 
In a context of ideological, political and economic change the CCP leadership 
began building a new economic system that was neither planned nor 
capitalist, aided, in 1993-94, by the press, economic journals and the publish-
ing industry, which examined every conceivable aspect of how the Party and 
government should create a socialist market economy and, particularly, how 
it should perform. At the same time, the State Council initiated experiments 
and economic reforms. These events can be reviewed under five key 
headings: 
1. The normative standards needed to evaluate the performance of a socialist 
market economy. 
2. The appropriate mixture of property rights. 
3. How economic enterprises should be formed and behave. 
4. How prices should be decided. 
5. Which economic institutions are necessary to adjust and control the 
socialist market economy. 
1. Normative Standards 
Deng insists that socialism means a highly productive economy and that for 
too long Chinese socialism has had only poverty. But Deng also believes in 
a socialism without income polarisation, exploitation and poverty (but rarely 
mentions its effect on the environment). Taking their cue from Deng, many 
elites now stress that socialism means fairness and equality, not to mention 
equal opportunity.27 In other words, developing socialism means enabling 
everyone to become wealthy at the same time, avoiding the income and 
wealth extremes of other societies and alleviating poverty.28 
Left-wing elites, however, have attacked the stress on productive forces, 
saying that it neglects the 'ownership system, regime, and spiritual civilisation'. 
They argue that 'if the ownership system is just a means and means can be 
changed, then we can conclude that any ownership system, including public 
27 Yang Shujin, 'Zhongguo shehui zhui shichang wenti tantao' [An inquiry into the essence 
of the market economy system of Chinese socialism],jingji yanjiu 5 (1994), pp.11-15. 
28 He Hui, 'New understanding of the essence of a socialist society', jingji sbebui tizbi 
bijiao 5 (10 August 1993), pp.53-(i, translated in]PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-93-084 
(23 November 1993), pp.1-4. He affirms the standards set forth by Deng but does not 
mention the environment. 
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ownership, and even the entire socialist system, can be changed'.29 Still other 
critics of the reforms attacked efforts to construct a new system of ownership', 
complaining, 'Why do we have to hand them [publicly-owned enterprises) over 
to private ownership in order that they may belong to somebody?' Similarly, 
they disapprove of enterprises contracting in the market, pointing out that 
'individual contractors have managed to be responsible for profits but never 
losses, so that the assets of many state-owned enterprises have been seriously 
eroded'.30Tuey also resist any downsizing of publicly-owned enterprises. 
Although such complaints represent a minority view, it is not known how 
deeply entrenched such resistance is and whether it can obstruct the ongoing 
reforms in the State Council. If the current economic boom can be sustained 
and controlled, and if the reforms produce prosperity without severe income 
inequality and unemployment, these leftist voices will be ignored. Should the 
reforms stumble, economic conditions worsen, and a power struggle erupt in 
the Party, however, these critics will be a force to be reckoned with. Mean-
while, a thornier issue is that of property rights. 
2. Property Rights 
The CCP under Mao tried to eliminate all private property, and not until the 
early 1980s did private enterprise and contracts, particularly of the long-term 
leasehold variety, revive in agriculture and flourish. The future for private 
property rights and contracts with private or foreign enterprises now seems 
bright as the leadership allows the growth of diversified forms of property 
rights. Recent surveys confirm that private enterprises are growing dynamically; 
a late-1993 survey of fifteen provinces found that early that year more than 
150,000 enterprises were registered as private.31 (However, 300/o of this sample 
had close connections with publicly-owned firms.) 
Surveys in 1994 found that between 1992 and 1993 the assets of private 
enterprises grew more rapidly than did those of collective and publicly-
29 Zhang Qinduo, 'Standards for distinguishing between social systems', Zhenli zhuiqiu 11 
(11 November 1993), pp.9-15, translated in]PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-93-090 (22 
December 1993), p .l. 
30 Jiang Yifan, 'Without state enterprise, there is no socialism', Zhenli zhuiqiu 9 (11 
September 1993), pp.6-9, translated in ]PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-93-084 (23 
November 1993), p.10. 
3l Bao Yueyang, 'Survey of privately owned enterprises in fifteen provinces reveals new 
features in developing China's private economy',jingji cankao bao, 28 September 1993, 
p.l, translated in]PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-93-085 (30 November 1993), pp.28-9. 
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owned firms.32 In some provinces, private enterprise increased its share of 
industrial output. In Guangdong province, for instance, private enterprises in 
1991 produced 29% of gross industrial output, compared with 15% and 20% 
for state and collective industries,33 and its production value grew 45% a year, 
compared with 71% from state and collective enterprises. 
Some elites have criticised this new trend of private property rights, 
arguing that: 
Absolutely exaggerating the role of productive forces and believing that once 
we have developed our productivity forces we would not slip to the capitalist 
road no matter what ownership system we have adopted, is as much a mistake 
as absolutely exaggerating the role of production relations and believing that 
with a large and collective organisation we would make the transition to a 
communist society despite our backward productive forces. 34 
In addition, many elites fear that affirming the appropriateness of diverse 
property rights will undermine public ownership of property. One critic 
asserted: 
Integrating a basically socialist system and a market economy requires firmly 
upholding the position and leading role of the public ownership system. 
Firmly upholding the position and leading role of the public ownership system 
requires enlivening medium and large-sized, state-owned enterprises. This 
accords with the logic of theoretical and practical developments.35 
Others, although denigrating the concept of private ownership,36 have few 
32 Cao Hong, 'Private businesses play a subsidiary role', China Daily, 12 March 1994, p.4, 
translated in FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-94-050 (15 March 1994), p.58. See also 
Hu Deqiao, 'Positive progress in reform of property rights system', Renmin ribao, 25 
February 1994, p .2, translated in FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-94-053 (18 March 
1994), p.53. 
33 'A new understanding of the private economy', Inside China Mainland 16.2 (issue 182) 
(February1994), p.40. 
34 Yun Xiliang, 'Comments on "ownership as a method, not an end"', Zhenli zhuiqiu 13 
(11 February 1994), pp.2-6, translated in]PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-94-032 (17 May 
1994), p.3. 
35 Wang Ruipu, article in Xuexi yu yanjiu 4 (15 February 1994), pp.5-6, translated in]PRS 
Report: China, JPRS-CAR-94-031 (13 May 1994), p .8. 
36 Liu Runwei, 'Clarifying the concept of "ownership mentality"', Zhenli zhuiqiu 8 (11 
August 1994), pp.26-7, translated in]PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-93-079 (29 October 
1993), pp.10-11. This Maoist, Utopian writer argues that community-shared wealth and 
ordinary people adhering to 'selfless spirituality' are the hallmarks of the natural, 
evolutionary course that socialist China should follow. 
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concrete suggestions for invigorating the debt-ridden, inefficient publicly-
owned enterpri~es. 
The debate continued about the optimal property rights mix for the new 
economy, and in 1993-94 leading economists convened to address the issue. 
Unable to agree on any overarching system, they concluded that 'ownership 
reform could go through a very long and difficult process, but the pace of 
reform must be accelerated'.37 A majority agreed they should focus on 
developing a 'shared cooperative system' of property rights that could be 
legally defined, used in the market-place, and approved by Party theorists. 
These economists agreed that everyone must be educated to understand that 
'property rights are sacred and inviolable', irrespective of the ownership 
system. They also agreed that as diverse forms of property rights evolved, both 
the state and the enterprise as well as the government and capital should be 
separate. Those conferences marked an important breakthrough, legitimating 
for the first time diverse forms of property rights but not identifying the 
socialist market economy with any particular form of property right. 
There is, of course, already in China a system of shared or cooperative 
property rights as seen in county-township enterprises in manufacturing and 
services; in the villages, where a mix of private property, cooperative, and 
leasehold contracting operates; and in the small and medium industries and 
services of the cities. But the shift in the composition of property rights for 
industrial enterprises between 1980 and 1991 has been dramatic.38 Thus, the 
true debate over property rights centres on the old state-owned enterprises, 
most of which were established before the 1980s. 
The question becomes, then, how can the old state-owned enterprises be 
transformed into efficient, modern enterprises that have cooperative property 
rights alongside some public ownership? Somehow, property rights must be 
redefined. Another breakthrough occurred recently when commentators 
agreed that 'separating the ownership rights of investors and the property 
37 Gao Lu, 'Call for reform of ownership, property rights-brief account of seventh, eighth 
symposiums at "Forum on China's market economy"', ]ingji ribao, 2 November 1993, 
p.l, translated in ]PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-94-oo6 (21 January 1994), pp.13-15. 
38 Fang Xiangdong, 'Enterprise reform under the existing economic pattern' ,]ingji yanjtu 
5 (20 May 1993), pp.24-31, translated in ]PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-93-069 (17 
September 1993), p.l. Between 1980 and 1991 the output value of industrial enterprises 
under state ownership fell from 76% to 59.9%, while for township and county collective 
enterprises it rose from 9.9% to 25.6%. Individually-owned industries only accounted for 
5.7% in 1991, but the percentage accounted for by services was much higher, though 
the precise figure even the authorities do not seem to know. 
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rights of the enterprise as legal person' was the key.39 (Only in the last two 
years has the term 'legal person' become acceptable in this discourse.)40 
As the dialogue evolved, the State Council adopted the following 
procedures for according the old, publicly-owned enterprises new property 
rights. First, all the assets of the old publicly-owned enterprises must be 
evaluated as well as their liabilities; having evaluated their net worth, the 
assets must be delineated, particularly if they are held by different forms of 
ownership such as merged enterprises and so on; and finally, the identified 
assets must be assigned to a new form of ownership. If the new ownership 
wants to trade those assets, markets, laws and professionals must manage the 
market transactions. Because more than 100,000 enterprises would be affect-
ed by these procedures,41 the State Council decided to experiment to find the 
best means to carry out this monumental transfer of property rights in an effort 
to establish new, modern enterprises that would be productive, compete 
efficiently in the market, and not violate the normative standards for the 
socialist market economy. 
3. Economic Organisations 
Never has such a complex economic revolution taken place more peacefully 
or more rapidly than the one in China in 1993-94. At the heart of these reforms 
is the restructuring of the old state enterprises, of which a third are profitable, 
another third receive state subsidies to stay afloat, and the final third conceal 
their debt by accounting subterfuges.42 The State Council has adopted various 
strategies to carry out this monumental restructuring: allowing state firms to 
39 Lu Dong, 'Corporate property rights for enterprises are the foundation for the modem 
enterprise system',jtngjtribao, 11May1994, pp.1-2, translated in]PRSReport: Cbina, 
JPRS-CAR-94-041 (26 July 1994), p .12. 
40 According to Lu Dong, the term 'legal person' was used in reports emanating from the 
3rd plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress. 
41 Ibid. Many articles show that a consensus was emerging in 1993-94 on how to transform 
state-owned enterprises into new corporate entities and how to operate in the market-
place. See Guo Peng, 'Privatisation-key issues in enterprise reform in 1994-a 
conversation concerning establishing a modem enterprise system', jtdian ribao, 4 
March 1994, p.2, translated in]PRSReport: Cbtna,JPRS-CAR-94-027 (2May1994), pp.4-
6; also 'Reform and incorporation of large and midsize state enterprises',]ingjigongzuo 
tongxun 2 (30 January 1994), translated in ]PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-94-026 (27 
April 1994), pp.2-5. 
42 Jiang Yifan, 'Give strong emphasis to development of state owned enterprises', Zbenli 
de zbuigqtu 8 (10 August 1994), pp.21-3, translated in]PRS Report: Cbtna, JPRS-CAR-
94-049 (14 October 1994), pp.1-2. 
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merge; allowing them to exit the market through bankruptcy; allowing them 
to adopt different property rights and management structures to operate in the 
market-place; experimenting with pilot projects to measure their assets and 
transfer those assets to new ownership-managerial forms; and allowing cities 
to intervene to assist them to operate in the market-place. 
In 1993 some 6,226 enterprises had merged.43 Although only 130 firms had 
been encouraged to exit the market through bankruptcy between 1989 and 
1990, some 710 did so in 1993.44 
By the end of 1993, China had over 10,300 experimental share-holding 
enterprises in all fields, with 182 joint-stock companies from more than twenty 
provinces and autonomous regions throughout China listed in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen, for an overall stock market value (for A shares) of about 400 billion 
yuan.45 
In 1994 the State Council permitted 3,800 enterprises to experiment freely 
with three types of property rights arrangements: 47% chose to grant shares 
to their staff and workers; 46% assigned property rights to a legal person 
having limited liability; and 70A> issued property rights to the public.46 
Equally important, in the spring of 1994 the State Council-trying to find 
a way to reform the old enterprise structure by 1996-97-selected, as part of 
a pilot project, one hundred state enterprises that would then proceed to cut 
their ties with the state.47 Various government departments and units valued 
the enterprises' assets and funds, delineated their property rights, liquidated 
their debts, and began seeking investor-owners. The State Council then desig-
nated certain commodities and the enterprises that produced and distributed 
them as 'state-owned cooperatives'. Most firms in the project, however, are 
being reorganised as limited-liability companies (legal persons), and only a 
few will become stake-holding companies, monopolising an industry or 
43 Hu Deqiao, 'Storming the fortifications: reform of China's property rights system', 
Zbongguo guoqtng guo/i 3 (28 March 1994), pp.12-13, translated in]PRS Report: Cbtna, 
JPRS-CAR-94-038 (28 June 1994), p .7. 
44 Wang Wuyi, 'Analyzing factors influencing the bankruptcies of China's state-owned 
enterprises', jtngji yanjiu 6 (20 June 1994), pp.41-7, translated in ]PRS Report: Cbtna . 
JPRS-CAR-94-045 (19 August 1994), p.18. 
45 Hu Deqiao, 'Storming the fortifications'. 
46 Interview in Zbongguogaige2 (13 February 1994), pp.ll-13, translated in FBIS, Daily 
Report: Cbtna, FBIS-CHI-94-053 (15 March 1994), p.51. 
47 Bai Yingzi, '100 Pilot-project enterprises engage in key endeavor to set up a mcxlem 
enterprise system', Qiye guan/i 152 (1 April 1994), pp.9-10, translated in]PRS Report. 
China, JPRS-CAR-94-038 (28 June 1994), pp.9-11 . 
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merging with a group of enterprises. 48 The State Council also drafted guide-
lines for new administrative structures, as follows: shareholders, board of 
directors, board of supervisors, and managers, each having specific functions 
of oversight, executive authority, accountability, and so forth. 
Meanwhile, the State Council surveyed the state assets and funds of ten 
thousand ageing, publicly-owned enterprises in 1993 and planned to do the 
same for another ten thousand in 1994.49 The Council, which used more than 
one thousand accounting and auditing agencies in the country to provide 
asset evaluation services, designed and authorised enterprise asset evaluation 
.certificates for each surveyed enterprise. 
In early 1994 the State Council began another experiment using 3, 199 large 
and medium-sized state industrial enterprises in ten cities. 50 With government 
help, city officials are guiding these firms to reduce their debt, eliminate exces-
sive functions, modernise, and, finally, if necessary, prepare for bankruptcy. 
Because cities depend on key state enterprises, the government hopes they 
can render direct and immediate help to struggling firms, bringing ageing state 
enterprises into the new market economy. In an experiment in late August 
1994, the State Council also tried to reduce the debt of state enterprises in 
eighteen cities. 51 Thus, in a variety of experiments---attrition, direct government 
support, city assistance, and evaluating state enterprise assets---the State 
Council has been pressing to change the property rights, ownership, and 
management of publicly-owned enterprises. 
Can the political leadership continue its reform and establish a modern 
corporate sector, dependent solely on the market, whose diverse ownership 
will satisfy the critics who fear the withering away of public ownership? The 
intent to reform exists; the CCP has empowered the State Council to reform 
48 Ibid., p.11. 
49 Wang Haiyan, 'The current problem of enterprise losses and its solutions',jingji wenti 
tansuo2(February1994), pp.14-15, translated in]PRSReport: China,]PRS-CAR-94-033 
24 (May 1994), p.9. 
so 'Leaders speak-optimise capital structure, increase enterprise strength, strive to do a 
good job with large and medium-sized state enterprises-speech given by state 
Economic and Trade Commission Director Wang Zhongyu', jingji gongzuo tongxun 6 
(30 March 1994), pp.9-11, translated in]PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-94-038 (28 June 
1994), p.5. 
5! Sun Shangwu, 'State farms need aid for good of economy', China Daily (9 September 
1994), p. l, translated in FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-94-175 (9 September 1994), 
p.51. See also 'Report on current events', Beijing China Radio International in Mandarin 
to Asia 0900 GMT, 27 August 1994, translated in FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-
94-168 (30 August 1994), p.34. 
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the urban, state-owned enterprises. But elite fears persist that expanding 
shareholder ownership and allowing excessive privatisation will destroy the 
essential character of this socialist system. In 1994, Liu Guoguan, a respected 
economist-reformer, addressed those fears: 
If only the state can maintain its position as the holder of controlling shares 
in terms of the total amount of a corporation's capital, the leading role of the 
state sector will not only not be weakened but will be strengthened, and the 
impact of the state sector will also expand.52 
But when the newly created shareholding companies began operating in 
1993, the value and profit of their assets greatly increased. 53 By the end of 1993 
there were some 9,440 new shareholding enterprises, of which 2,968 were 
limited stock companies, 6,472 were limited liability companies, and 1,776 
were internally held stock companies. Did the government control sufficient 
stock in those firms to ensure that the state would not be enfeebled but 
strengthened (Liu's standard)? We as yet lack the information to answer this, 
for it is too early to evaluate whether the property rights of the modem corpor-
ate system now evolving, along with a refurbished state enterprise system, will 
be greatly or lightly controlled by the state. If in the next six years this 
transformation occurs as the State Council anticipates, it will be a remarkable 
transition indeed. Although it is too early to predict success, it is a vision of 
great significance and magnitude. 
4. Tbe Price System 
By the end of 1992, the government controlled the retail prices of only 5.9% 
of commodities in society, the prices of 12.5% of all agricultural products sold 
by farmers to the state, and the prices of 18.7% of capital goods sold by 
industrial enterprises. 54 At the same time, the industrial products that farmers 
could purchase with the same 0978) basket of farm goods increased by 
52 'Construct solid actors in the socialist market economy-an interview with Professor Liu 
Guoguang, a prominent economist', Gaige 1 (20 January 1994), pp.5--9, translated in 
]PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-94-018 (18 March 1994), p.13. 
53 Xiao Feng, 'The shareholding system reform achieves eight types of progress in '93-
throughout the nation there are nearly 10,000 newly added shareholding enterprises, 
reaching a grand total of more than 13,000', Zhongguo xinxi bao (4 March 1994), p.l, 
translated in ]PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-94-035 (3 June 1994), p.9. 
54 Zou Xiangqun, 'Words written at the top--how can the government manage price?', 
]ingji ribao, 8 April 1994, pp.1--2, translated in]PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-94-036 (10 
June 1994), p.17. 
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60.5)0/o, and some 95% of the price of imported goods bore a direct relationship 
to international market prices. The majority of goods and services (except 
those provided by the state) are now determined by market forces. 
Chinese officials complain that speculation, hoarding, and a lack of market 
integration distort the price allocation system; for example, steel firms expand 
their supply when investment inflates in response to demand from the 
construction industry and then suffer high inventories when the construction 
price boom collapses. 55 These officials hope, however, that as markets integ-
rate and consumers pay the full price to use the market-place, price volatility 
will recede. Prices for energy, railroad transportation and other services are 
subsidised by the state rather than increased to cover costs. Until per capita 
income rises, the state will continue to keep prices low. 
For the foreseeable future, then, the state will monitor prices, fix prices of 
critical goods and services, and stockpile grain, petroleum, and other goods in 
anticipation of possible future scarcities.56 But the political leaders now depend 
on the market to improve productivity, increase supply, generate income, and 
teach enterprises how to organise and earn profits. 
5. Economic Institutions 
If prices are now primarily determined by the domestic and global economy, 
what macro-reforms are needed to manage this socialist market economy? 
Experts and elites realise that the fis~al and monetary institutions that served 
the planned economy must be reformed and that new institutions must be 
created to manage the market system. First, the fiscal system must be made 
to match up with the evolving market economy.57 Tax experts acknowledge 
that the present fiscal system lacks uniformity, fairness and efficiency, with 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., p.19. This official explains that the state will maintain a 'reserve system for 
important commodities such as grain, cotton, and petroleum' to use in the market to 
regulate prices. The state will also have an 'adjustment fund for the prices of grain and 
nonstaple foods to be used to reduce prices when large increases or declines occur in 
their prices'. The state will try to regulate and encourage fair market competition through 
laws and their enforcement. A system will be established to provide price information. 
The state also must encourage enterprises to utilise the market more effectively, and the 
state will intervene in the market to protect consumers and ensure the supply of essential 
capital goods. The State Council already monitors the prices of twenty commodities and 
services vitally affecting living standards. 
57 Lou Jiwei and Li Keping, 'Basic approach for building a new macro-economic regulation 
and control, and a state-owned assets management system', Gaigi 5 (20 September 
1993), pp.18-29, translated in ]PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-93-091 (29 December 
1993), pp.10-20. 
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one official allowing that more than one-third of the country's 500,000 tax-
collecting officials supervise a private sector that yields only So/O of industrial 
and commercial tax revenue. 58 To make matters worse, the new enterprises 
and specialised markets are grossly undertaxed, and the country has no 
unified income tax code for households and enterprises. Even so, a new 
income tax passed in 1994 established a '35%-50% progressive tax rate on 
excess profits earned by individually-owned workshops and stores and giving 
special care to low-income eamers•. 59 
By devoting its efforts toward reform and supporting the ageing state 
enterprises which had generated most of the government's income, the state 
has neglected to instruct central and local administrations in how to tax and 
collect tax revenues.6<> Therefore, with state expenditure exceeding tax 
revenue, the state feverishly now tries to tax the dynamic parts of the Chinese 
economy in an effort to cool inflation as well as to expand the tax base and 
increase tax revenue. For example, to deal with skyrocketing land values and 
real estate speculation, the State Council announced a high value-added tax 
that calls for taxing a land developer's sales as well as the profits realised by 
appreciating market value: 'If the value added on the property's sale price is 
below 50%, the value-added tax is 30% of the value added and rises progres-
sively until the value-added tax is 60%'.61 In early 1994 the State Council also 
passed an industrial and commercial tax law setting the enterprise income tax 
rate at 33% (compared with an earlier 55% proportional rate). (To show 
consideration to small firms, two lower tax rates were set.)62 The new tax also 
58 'Individual tax collection and administration faces new circumstances and new 
problems-record of conversation with ranking person in the Collection and 
Administration Department, State Administration of Taxation', Zhongguo shuiwu baa, 
19 July 1993, pp.1-2, translated in]PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-93-073 (30 September 
1993), p.24 . 
59 Wang Shujiu, 'A study of adjustment to make some people better off first and to achieve 
common prosperity', Caimao jingji 5 (11 May 1994), pp.311-33, translated in ]PRS 
Report: China, JPRS-CAR-94-045 (19 August 1994), p.40. 
6<l Zhang Wen, 'Perfecting the taxation system: effectively dealing with the relations in the 
intended tax assignment system', Tangtai 35 (15 February 1994), translated in }PRS 
Report: China, JPRS-CAR-94-034 (26 May 1994), p.13. 
6l K'ung P'u, 'Two different choices the mainland faces today', Chiu-shih nien-tai 3 (1 
March 1994), pp.42-3, translated in}PRS Report: China,]PRS-CAR-94-031 (13May1994), 
p.26. 
62 Zan Fuxiang, 'The new features of the new industrial and commercial tax system' ,jidian 
ribao, 2 April 1994, p.2, translated in }PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-94-033 (24 May 
1994), pp.33-4. 
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aimed at .delimiting jurisdiction over central and local revenue and tax 
management and imposed value-added taxes on commodities. This complex 
example of fiscal streamlining and unification, which requires more analysis 
than space allows here, reflects the State Council's efforts to modernise the 
fiscal system while trying to control severe inflation. 
Similarly, special banking studies were being undertaken that would 
reform the banks and build a more effective central banking system.63 In 
August 1993 the State Council agreed that state banks should begin the 
transition to becoming commercial banks, able to operate in the market 
economy. By December 1994 that important reform had not yet taken place, 
perhaps stymied by the vested interest groups within the banking system that 
oppose such a reform.64 The State Council also studied ways to improve non-
bank financial institutions and develop a capital market where corporate 
stock could be exchanged and corporate bonds issued and purchased.65 An 
important breakthrough occurred in early 1994, when, as mentioned earlier, 
the PRC moved from the old dual exchange rate system to a single exchange 
rate,66 reducing the turnover of foreign exchange and increasing its supply. 
(The foreign exchange certificates of the former system were reclaimed.) The 
state established an interbank foreign exchange market in five major cities, 
and other cities entered the system after 1 April 1994. These actions reveal a 
state determined to improve the operation of its domestic and foreign financial 
markets to attract foreign investrnent.67 Finally, plans are underway for a new 
63 Xie Ping, 'On reform of the specialized banks',]ingji yanjiu 2 (2 February 1994), pp.22-
8, translated in]PRS Reporl: China, JPRS-CAR-94-033 (24 May 1994), pp.6-33. 
64 This information is based on conversations with the Chinese economist Wu Jinglian of 
the State Council's Development Research Center. 
65 Li Yang, 'Establishing a highly efficient capital market is an important component of 
financial reform', ]ingji cankao baa, 15 February 1994, p .4, translated in]PRS Reporl: 
China, JPRS-CAR-94-024 (15 April 1994), pp.20-2. There is no mention of the serious 
indebtedness of banks as they index depositors' accounts while paying inflationary 
interest rates of 22% to 26% but charge low interest rates of SoAi to 1()% on their loans. 
If this is a ticking time-bomb of possible banking collapse, the economic reforms indeed 
rest on shaky financial foundations. 
66 Wang Zhi, 'Reform of the exchange rate system moves into high gear', ]ingji ribao, 1 
April 1994, p.3, translated in ]PRS Reporl: China, JPRS-CAR-94-037 (17 June 1994), 
pp.23-4. 
67 For other financial reforms, see discussions of the Central Bank's new open market 
operations in Liu Keqian and Zhang Fengxi, 'Open market operations-a major reform 
of China's Central Bank regulation and control of the money supply', Liaowang 14 (4 
April 1994), pp.10-11, translated in]PRSRepon: China,JPRS-CAR-94-037(17June1994), 
pp.37-9. 
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social security system to replace the rapidly disappearing Maoist-type 
corporate enterprise and 'unit' (danwei) system of social welfare imbedded 
in the old state enterprises.68 
The discussions, studies and reforms of fiscal, financial and monetary 
institutions of the last two years attest to the CCP's vigorous determination to 
establish new economic institutions, facilitate an expanding market economy, 
and avoid market failures. This socialist state will intervene in the market 
whenever the experts and authorities are convinced it is necessary. Equally 
important, the current dialogue and experiments aim to improve financial 
markets and expand their operations in urban and rural China. If these 
economic reforms succeed, by the year 2000 the Chinese economy will resume 
the structure and form of Taiwan's economy in the 1970s. In other words, the 
CCP's socialist market economy is nothing more than the Sun Yat-sen-style 
state-guided market economy to guarantee the people's welfare (minsheng), 
which the Guomindang accomplished in the Republic of China on Taiwan. 
Some Reflections 
The concept of a socialist market economy is an oxymoron in Western parlance, 
but to the Chinese, such phrases convey imagination, visionary undertakings, 
and paradoxes, as well as contradictions. By adding Chinese characteristics 
to that socialist market economy, the Chinese remind us that culture counts 
and that we devalue it at our peril. Failing to understand the values, orientations 
and feelings of the Chinese leadership means misinterpreting or misunder-
standing what the Chinese say. A new economic system now evolves before 
our eyes. The old planned economy is dead; yet capitalism as defined by 
private-property-dominated enterprises does not exist. What kind of property 
rights and state controls will characterise the economic sector by the year 2000 
will determine whether this so-called socialist market economy can perform 
according to the standards of its founders. 
The complex dialogue of the past few years is intelligent, analytic, usually 
devoid of ideology, and deadly serious. That dialogue contains a strong 
normative rhetoric on how the new economy should behave-namely, it 
68 joint Project Research of the Zhejiang Provincial Department of Finance and the 
Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Finance, 'A study of improvement of 
enterprises' social security system', Caizbengyanjiu 7 (5 July 1994), pp.15-21 , translated 
in ]PRS Report: China, JPRS-CAR-94-050 (21 October 1994), pp.19-25. 
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should be productive and innovative but be competitive and not produce 
greater income inequality. The Chinese have been making normative statements 
for the past five thousand years and are not about to change as the twenty-
first century approaches.69 At the same time, the discourse reveals a refreshingly 
open, honest appraisal of current problems, past mistakes, and the challenging 
alternatives that loom ahead. Experienced officials, economic experts, and 
scholars freely ventilate their views. Differences of opinion are tolerated; 
critical evaluations flourish. Yet there is an optimism, sometimes bordering on 
Utopianism, that the nation can achieve the impossible by avoiding the 
pathologies associated with a planned economy and a capitalist market 
economy. 
This discourse also covers nearly all aspects of a market economy, as the 
above review suggests, except how losers in the market will exit and how 
productive forces can be expected to expand unlimitedly. One senses that the 
Chinese have only recently discovered the wonders of the market-place and 
recognised its advantages. It is not always clear that they understand the costs 
of using the market-place (what Ronald H. Coase refers to as those different 
transaction costs that must be handled by creating institutions, organisations, 
and so forth, either within the enterprise or external to it) . But they are 
gradually realising that markets must be created, because without them it is 
impossible to modernise and expand the forces of production. 
In-depth study and review, conferences of experts and officials, and pilot 
projects as well as large-scale government experiments in 1993 and 1994 will, 
it is hoped, pave the way for a socialist market economy by the year 2000. The 
scale and complexity of these experiments are prodigious and extend to all 
the major cities of the country and beyond; at their core is the conversion of 
tens of thousands of state-owned enterprises into modern corporations 
functioning in different markets. There seems to be a consensus of the State 
Council, its experts, and supporting research institutes on the sequence of 
procedures necessary to implement the difficult transfer of state-enterprise 
property rights to new forms of legal property rights. Many of these proced-
ures have already begun, with much of their success depending on a complete 
and accurate assessment of enterprise assets. If such nationwide procedures 
falter or are incomplete, like the many land-ownership surveys in the imperial 
era, the reforms will fail. 
Then there is the possibility that the economy will be mismanaged because 
69 These observations owe much to my conversations with Thomas Metzger over the 
years. 
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of human error, unpredictable social disturbances, natural disasters, orunforeseen 
national and international crises and political reversals. Meanwhile, enemies 
of reform express their views in the ongoing discourse by criticising the 
reforms' ideological impurity and emphasising that serious socioeconomic 
troubles could overwhelm the leadership. In late summer 1994, a group of 
CCP conservatives hostile to the reforms met in Zhengzhow city, Honan prov-
ince, to publicise, through articles and speeches, how Deng's socialist market 
economy has undermined socialism's foundations--public ownership and 
common prosperity.70 One article in the press, written by an academic sym-
pathetic to Maoist ideas, complained that 'some people have disregarded the 
national situation and borrowed the capitalist market economy in its entirety' .71 
In the fall of 1994 a book entitled Looking at China through a Tbird Eye 
was published by Shanxi Province Publishing House but was immediately 
banned and withdrawn.72 The author, whose name transliterated from Manda-
rin is Luo Yi Ningeer, allegedly a famous German Sinologist, is unknown in 
China. The book describes a Chinese economy out of control, swamped by 
hundreds of millions of rural people looking for work, and a society in which 
socialist values are fast disappearing and the institutions that kept the rural 
people on the land fast breaking down.73 Other such predictions of gloom are 
frequently sounded in the PRC. Critics of the Deng reforms predict disaster, 
and democracy activists complain that the emerging market system must 
make rapid political reforms or the country will be swept away by crises. The 
complaints of the right and the left feed hysterical rumours and highlight only 
the dark sides of Chinese society. 
No communist-party-ruled country has yet successfully made the transition 
from socialism to a prosperous, stable and democratic society without 
70 Willy Wo-lap Lam, 'Leading conservatives reportedly discuss reversing reforms', South 
ChinaMorningPost, 6September1994, pp.1, 10, translated in FBIS, Daily Report: China, 
FBIS-CHI-94-172 (6 September 1994), p.43. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Patrick E . Tyler, 'Bold book tells a tale of change in China', New York Times, 9 October 
1994, p .10-Y. 
73 See Joseph Fewsmith's review of Luo Yi Ningeer, 'Disanzhi yanjing kan Zhongguo' 
[Looking at China through a third eye], in journal of Contemporary China 7 (Fall 1994), 
pp.100--4 . The book's core thesis is the following, according to Fewsmith: 'The reform 
period has corroded faith in Marxism/Leninism, undermined the power and authority 
of the party and state, and unleashed a host of social problems-including corruption, 
crime, economic polarisation, and moral decay--that the government, given its weak-
ened authority, is increasingly unable to deal with'. 
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experiencing enormous political and economic difficulties. Observing the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the chaos that followed in 1989-90, the CCP 
leadership became convinced that the Soviet Communist Party had lost control 
because it failed to develop a productive economy that provided prosperity 
for its people and strong national security.74 How to make this transition has 
so far eluded every Marxist regime in the twentieth century. But Marxist 
regimes are not the only societies confronting awesome challenges. Western 
societies also seek a middle path between a state-dominated socialism and a 
privatised market economy to revitalise economies with declining standards 
of civilisation and deep human alienation. · 
Minxing Pei argues that communist systems have great difficulty making 
a transition to the new because their leaders rely on 'the existing institutions of 
the communist party-state to serve as the instruments of change'.75 According 
to Pei, a successful transition from communism requires that communist reform-
ers correctly sequence their reforms and build new institutions. They must 
also build social and political support for the changes they promote. So far, 
the PRC's leaders and elite have fulfilled these tasks, but they should also learn 
from the successful Taiwan modernisation and democratisation experience. 
Through the ages, China has stood apart from other civilisations. When 
unified, its leadership has been characterised by a powerful ruler striving to 
project a sage-like image, a bureaucracy regulating the society and economy, 
and an elite debating how to perfect a moral society based on sacred, moral 
principles rooted in Confucianism. Central to this debate was how to organise 
the leadership's relationship to the society and the economy: whether to allow 
the society to become differentiated, market-oriented and pluralistic in its 
thoughts and institutions, or whether to make it communal, simple in lifestyle, 
and monodoctrinal in thought and beliefs. According to Thomas A. Metzger, 
these competing visions shared by China's elites originated from Confucianism 
and, respectively, were accommodative of the outer world or transformative 
of that same world.76 
74 Jialin Zhang, 'China's response to the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union', Essays in Public Policy, no.48 (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1994), p.26. 
75 See in particular Minxin Pei, From Reform to Revolution: Tbe Demise of Communism in 
China and the Soviet Union (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp.205-6. 
76 For the articulation of these concepts see Thomas A. Metzger, F.scape from Predicament: 
Neo-Confucianism and China 's Evolving Political Culture (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977). The discussion developed here is principally based on the 
conceptualisation and research of Metzger. 
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But through the ages, various individuals violently installed themselves as 
emperors and either used radical means to transform the society and human 
beliefs or relied on gradual, flexible means to permit society to evolve but 
under the watchful eye of the state. At the same time, these rulers and elites 
tried to impose their absolute, personalised authority on society by appealing 
to ideology and arbitrarily using their power. 77 For these complex reasons, 
Chinese society never established any basic rules in the polity independent 
of the ruling authority and the power holders. Without such rules and 
perpetually embracing institutions and a culture that guaranteed the arbitrary 
use of power by the ruler and elite, Chinese rulers and elite through the 
millennia vacillated between transformative and accommodative patterns of 
thinking and policy-making. 
A major reason China's rulers and elite never broke out from the cycles of 
autocracy and chaos was that they never evaluated and analysed in any 
pragmatic, non-Utopian and rational way how to establish a rule-compliant 
polity, society and economy. It is remarkable, then, that only the Chinese society 
of Taiwan under Guomindang rule made the successful transition to modernity 
and a consolidated democracy.78 After 1950 the KMT created the basic rules 
enabling the society first to build a market economy along with an ideological 
market-place, followed in the mid-1980s by a political market-place. By 
correctly sequencing these developments, establishing rules, building new 
political, educational and economic institutions, and winning social support, 
Taiwan began to behave in a rule-abiding way. Enough elites became pragmatic 
and non-Utopian to assist the ruling party to carry out its modernisation 
mission.79The Guomindang, having learned bitter lessons from its defeat by the 
CCP, reorganised itself and adopted an instrumental rationality that emphasised 
rule-compliance in policy-making and institution-building.8() 
The key question for the PRC is whether the CCP leaders and the elites, 
77 For a good account of this Chinese pattern of autocratic rule, see Zhengyuan Fu, Auto-
cratic Tradition and Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
78 Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, 'The first Chinese democracy: political development 
of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1986-1994', Asian Survey 34.3 (March 1994), 
pp .213-29. 
79 See Thomas A. Metzger and Ramon H. Myers, 'Two diverging societies', in Ramon H. 
Myers, ed., Two Societies in Opposition: the Republic of China and the People's Republic 
of China After Forty Years (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1991), pp.xiii-xiv. 
80 Thomas A. Metzger, 'The Chinese reconciliation of moral-sacred values with modern 
pluralism: political discourse in the ROC, 1949-1989', in Myers, Two Societies in 
Opposition, pp.3-56. 
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at the present historical crossroads, can adopt a similar mindset and in a sober, 
pragmatic, realistic way build a new economic system. Or will the elite and 
opponents subject the current reforms to Utopian standards and try to 
delegitimise the reformers and their reforms, thus plunging the country into 
power struggle and possible chaos? If the CCP's rulers and elite can establish 
rules and institutions to build a new market economy and, eventually, 
ideological and political market-places, China just might escape disaster. 
THE GEORGE ERNEST MORRISON 
LECTURE IN ETHNOLOGY 
The George Ernest Morrison Lecture was founded by Chinese residents in Australia 
and others in honour of the late Dr G. E Morrison, a native of Geelong, Victoria, 
Australia. 
The objects of the foundation of the lectureship were to honour for all time 
the memory of a great Australian who rendered valuable services to China, and 
to improve cultural relations between China and Australia. The foundation of the 
lectureship had the official support of the Chinese Consulate-General, and was 
due, in particular, to the efforts of Mr William Liu, merchant, of Sydney, Mr William 
Ah Ket, barrister, of Melbourne, and Mr F.]. Quinlan and Sir Colin MacKenzie of 
Canberra. From the time of its inception until 1948 the lecture was associated with 
the Australian Institute of Anatomy, but in the latter year the responsibility for the 
management of the lectureship was taken over by the Australian National 
University, and the lectures delivered since then have been given under the 
auspices of that University. 
Tbe following lectures have been delivered: 
Inaugural: Dr W. P. Chen (Consul-General for China in Australia), Tbe Objects 
of the Foundation of the Lectureship, and a Review of Dr Morrison 's Life 
in China, 10 May 1932 
2nd: W. Ah Ket (Barrister at Law), Eastern Thought, with More Particular 
Reference to Confucius, 3 May 1933 
3rd: J. S. MacDonald (Director, National Art Gallery, New South Wales), Tbe 
History and Development of Chinese An, 3 May 1934 
4th: Dr W. P. Chen (Consul-General for China in Australia), Tbe New Culture 
Movement in China, 10 May 1935 
25 
5th: Dr Wu Lien-teh (Director, National Quarantine Service, China), 
Reminiscences of George E. Morrison; and Chinese Abroad, 2 September 
1936 
6th: Dr Chun-jien Pae (Consul-General for the Republic of China), China 
Today: with Special Reference to Higher Education, 4 May 1937 
7th: A. F. Barker (Professor of Textile Industries, Chiao-tung University, 
Shanghai, China), The Impact of Western Industrialism on China, 
17 May 1938 
8th: Professor S. H. Roberts (Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sydney), 
The Gifts of the Old China to the New, 5 June 1939 
9th: His Grace the Archbishop of Sydney, Howard Mowll, West China as 
Seen Through the Eyes of the Westerner, 29 May 1940 
lOth: W. G. Goddard, The Ming Shen. A Study in Chinese Democracy, 5 June 
1941 
llth: D. B. Copland, The Chinese Social Structure, 27 September 1948 
12th: ]. K. Rideout, Politics in Medieval China, 28 October 1949 
13th: C. P. FitzGerald, The Revolutionary Tradition in China, 19 March 1951 
14th: H. V. Evatt, Some Aspects of Morrison's Life and Work, 4 December 1952 
15th: Lord Lindsay of Birker, China and the West, 20 October 1953 
16th: M. Titiev, Chinese Elements in Japanese Culture, 27 July 1954 
17th: H. Bielenstein, Emperor Kuang-wu (AD 2~27) and the Northern 
Barbarians, 2 November 1955 • 
18th Leonard B. Cox, The Buddhist Temples of Yun-kang and Lung-men, 
17 October 1956 
19th Otto P. N. Berkelbach van der Sprenkel, The Chinese Civil Seroice, 
4 November 1957 
20th A. R. Davies, The Narrow Lane: Some Obseroations on the Recluse in 
Traditional Chinese Society, 19 November 1958 
21st: C. N. Spinks, The Khmer Temple of Prah Vihar, 6 October 1959 
22nd: Chen Chih-mai, Chinese Landscape Painting: The Golden Age, 
5 October 1960 • 
23rd: L. Carrington Goodrich, China 's Contacts With Other Parts of Asia in 
Ancient Times, 1August1961 
24th: N. G. D. Malmqvist, Problems and Methods in Chinese Linguistics, 
22 November 1962 • 
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25th: H. F. Simon, Some Motivations of Chinese Foreign Policy, 3 October 
1963 
26th: Wang Ling, Calendar, Cannon and Clock in the Cultural Relations 
between Europe and China, 18 November 1964 
27th: A. M. Halpern, Chinese Foreign Policy-Success or Failure?, 9 August 
1966. 
28th: ). W. de Jong, Budda's Word in China, 18 October 1967 
29th: ). D. Frodsham, New Perspectives in Chinese Literature, 23 July 1968 • 
30th: E. A. Huck, 1be Assimilation of the Chinese in Australia, 6 November 
1969. 
31st: K. A. Wittfogel, Agriculture: A Key to the Understanding of Chinese 
Society, Past and Present, 6 April 1970 
32nd: I. de Rachewiltz, Prester John and Europe's Discovery of East Asta, 
3 November 1971 • 
33rd: Eugene Kamenka, Marx, Marxism and China, 6 September 1972 
34th: Liu Ts'un-yan, On the Art of Ruling a Big Country: Views of Three 
Chinese Emperors, 13 November 1973 • 
35th: Jerome Ch'en, Peasant Activism in Contemporary China, 22 July 1974 
36th: Yi-fu Tuan, Chinese Attitudes to Nature: Idea and Reality, 3 September 
1975 
37th: Lo Hui-min, 1be Tradition and Prototypes of the China-Watcher, 
27 October 1976 • 
38th: Roy Hofheinz, People, Places and Politics in Modern China, 17 August 
1977 
39th: Mark Elvin, Self-Liberation and Self-Immolation tn Modern Chinese 
Thought, 13 September 1978 • 
40th: Wang Gungwu, Power, Right and Duties in Chinese History, 
19 September 1979 • 
4lst: Fang Chao-ying, 1be Great Wall of China: Keeping Out or Keeping In?, 
5 June 1980 
42nd: Tien Ju-k'ang, Moslem Rebellion tn China. A Yunnan Controversy, 
17 June 1981 • 
43rd: Alan Thome, China and Australia: Forty Thousand Years of Contac~ 
4 August 1982 
44th: Chan Hok-lam, Control of Publishing in China, Past and Presen~ 
24 August 1983 • 
45th: ). S. Gregory, The Chinese and their Revolutions, 8 August 1984 • 
46th: Allen S. Whiting, China and the World: Independence v. Dependence, 
31 July 1985 • 
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47th: Pierre Ryckmans, The Chinese Attitude Towards the Past, 16 July 1986 • 
48th: Jean Chesneaux, China in the Eyes of the French Intellectuals, 24 June 
1987• 
49th: Ross Garnaut, China: One Country, Two Systems, 17 August 1988 • 
50th: Stephen Fitzgerald, Australia's China, 9 November 1989 • 
51st: Rafe de Crespigny, Man from the Margin: Cao Cao and the Three 
Kingdoms, 8 November 1990 • 
52nd: Beverley Hooper, Rethinking Contemporary China, 21 November 1991 • 
53rd: The Dalai Lama of Tibet, 8 May 1992 (lecture not published) 
54th: W .). F. Jenner, A Knife in my Ribs for a Mate: Reflections on Another 
Chinese Tradition, 6 October 1993 • 
• Limited stocks available from the Contemporary China Centre, Research School of 
Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University 

